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I.

Statement of the Case
A.

Nature of the Case

This is an appeal of a district court decision reversing the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals
(BTA) holding that the Ashton Urban Renewal Agency lacked standing to challenge a property
tax exemption granted by the Fremont County Board of Equalization because it was not a
"person aggrieved" under I.C. § 63-511.

B.

The Course of Proceedings Below

On January 19,2011, Ashton Memorial, Inc. (Ashton Memorial) filed for tax exemptions
with the Fremont County Board of Equalization. The Ashton Urban Renewal Agency
(hereinafter AURA) opposed that request. On July 8, 2011, the Board of Equalization granted
the tax exemption. On August 9,2012, AURA appealed the tax exemption to the Idaho Board of
Tax Appeals (BT A). Ashton Memorial filed an Answer, which included, among other defenses,
the assertion that AURA lacked standing to appeal the exemptions. On November 29,2011, the
BTA entered its Final Order Dismissing Appeals. (BTA R. p. 22-25) The BTA ruled that
AURA lacked standing to appeal the tax exemption as it was not an aggrieved person under I.C.
§ 63-511. On January 5, 2012, the BTA denied AURA's request for reconsideration. (BTA R. p.
55-56) On February 2,2012, AURA filed a petition for judicial review with the district court.
(R. p. 4-5) The issue was briefed and the district court heard argument. On August 10,2012, the
district court issued its Decision on Review in which it reversed the BTA's decision and
remanded the matter to the BTA for consideration on the merits. (R. p. 100-112) On September
18,2012, Ashton Memorial filed its Notice of Appeal. (R. p. 113-115) The Clerk's Record did

APPELLANTS' BRIEF - Page 1

not initially include the BTA's record and the parties stipulated to its inclusion in the record.
They subsequently stipulated to paginate the BTA's record for ease of reference.

C.

Statement of the Facts

Ashton Memorial Inc. is an Idaho Corporation doing business as Ashton Living Center in
Ashton, Idaho. Ashton Memorial provides assisted living services, medical care and nursing
care. Ashton Memorial applied for a property tax exemption for the 2011 tax year pursuant to
I.C. § 63-602C and was granted an exemption.
The Ashton Urban Renewal Agency (AURA) is an urban renewal agency created
pursuant to the Idaho Urban Renewal Law of 1965, title 50, chapter 20, Idaho Code, as amended
and the Local Economic Development Act, title 50, chapter 29, Idaho Code, as amended. Ashton
Memorial has real and personal property located within the revenue allocation area of AURA.
AURA receives funds from levied taxes pursuant to I.C. § 50-2908 and has appealed the tax
exemption granted to Ashton Memorial.

D.

Standard of Review

When a district court conducts a trial de novo in an appeal of a BTA decision, the Idaho
Supreme Court defers to the district court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial
evidence, but exercises free review over the district court's conclusions of law. Kimbrough v.

Idaho Bd. o/Tax Appeals, 150 Idaho 417, 419-420, 247 P.3d 644, 646 - 647 (2011). In this case,
the district court did not conduct a trial, but rather ruled as a matter of law that AURA was
entitled to appeal to the BTA pursuant to I.C. § 63-511 (1) as it qualified as a person aggrieved
and remanded the matter to the BTA for consideration on its merits. The interpretation of a
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statute is a question of law which this Court freely reviews. Id.

H.

Issues of Appeal
A.

Is AURA a "person aggrieved" pursuant to I.C. § 63-511 and thus, entitled to
appeal the Board of Equalization's decision granting Ashton Memorial tax
exempt status?

B.

Did the district court have jurisdiction to hear AURA's appeal from the BTA
when AURA failed to provide notice of the petition to Fremont County as
required by I.R.C.P. 84(b )(1)?

HI.

Argument
A.

AURA is not a "person aggrieved" pursuant to I.e. § 63-511(1) as it is only
entitled to receive, pursuant to I.e. § 50-2908, "the balance, if any, of funds
from taxes levied on taxable property" and as such, has no interest in
unlevied taxes.

The right to appeal a decision of a county Board of Equalization is described in I.e. § 63511 (1) which reads as follows:
Any time within thirty (30) days after mailing of notice of a decision of the board
of equalization, or pronouncement of a decision announced at a hearing, an appeal
of any act, order or proceeding of the board of equalization, or the failure of the
board of equalization to act may be taken to the board of tax appeals. Such appeal
may only be filed by the property owner, the assessor, the state tax commission or
by a person aggrieved when he deems such action illegal or prejudicial to the
public interest. Nothing in this section shall be construed so as to suspend the
payment of property taxes pending said appeal.
(Emphasis added). AURA is not the property owner, assessor, or state tax commissioner, and
has asserted that it is a person aggrieved under the statute. The statute does not define person
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aggrieved. 1 Both BTA and the district court relied on Idaho Supreme Court cases interpreting
similar language in other statutes. In 1898, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed the issue of when
a party is aggrieved and entitled to appeal in State v. Eves, 6 Idaho 144,53 P. 543 (1898). In

Eves, the state brought an action to enforce a statute that allowed the state to receive damages
when a suit was brought on a contract in which the rate of interest was higher than allowed by
statute. Id. 6 Idaho at 144-145, 53 P. 543 -544. Idaho brought the suit nearly three years after
Eves had received a judgment on a contract whose interest rate exceeded that allowed by statute.

Id The Idaho Supreme Court ruled that the statute authorizing the penalty did not authorize a
separate suit and dismissed the appeal. Id. In doing so, it explained the procedure the state
should have followed to enforce the penalty. Id. The Court explained that when the state sought
to enforce the penalty in a case in which a judgment had already been granted on a contract with
a rate greater than allowed that the "correct practice is for the state on behalf of the county to
make a proper showing upon notice to all parties to the record, and move to have such judgment
modified so as to make it conform to the provisions of [the statute]; and, if the court denies such
motion, to appeal from the order denying the same." Id. The Court then went on to explain that
the state would be entitled to appeal even though it was not a party of record to the original case.
The Court stated as follows:
Section 4802, Rev. St., provides that any party aggrieved may appeal in the cases
prescribed in the Code; and, when it is made to appear, as provided by said section
1266, that a suit is brought on a usurious contract, it then becomes the duty of the

IThe phrase person aggrieved or similar language appears in at least eleven other
locations in Title 63 in reference to the right to appeal or seek reconsideration: I.C. §§ 63-409,
63-711(4),63-1006(4),63-1404(5),63-2516, 63-2563, 63-2708, 63-3074, 63-3812, 63-4208(b),
63-4208( c).
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court to render ajudgment as therein directed. If the court refuses to do so, the
state, on behalf of the county in which the suit is brought, is an aggrieved party,
and is entitled to an appeal, the same as any party to the suit. But we think the
better practice is to make the proper motion to correct or modifY the erroneous
judgment, and, in case such motion be denied, appeal from the order denying the
same. This method of procedure calls the matter directly to the attention of the
court, and would, no doubt, in many cases prevent the costs and delay of an
appeal. Section 4802, Rev. St., is the same as section 938, Code Civ. Proc. Cal.,
and under that section the supreme court of that state have held in Adams v.
Woods, 8 Cal. 306, that a party aggrieved by a judgment has the right of appeal
although he is not a party to the record; and it is laid down as a general rule that
no one who is not a party or privy to a judgment or prejudiced thereby has the
right of appeal. The test as to whether a party is aggrieved or not is: "Would the
party have had the thing if the erroneous judgment had not been entered? If the
answer be yea, he is a party aggrieved." In the case at bar, had not an erroneous
judgment been entered, judgment in favor of the state would have been entered for
the amount of the penalty provided.

Id. After having explained how the matter should have been handled, the Court dismissed the
state's appeal and awarded costs to Eves. Id.
In the other case cited by the BTA and the district court, Application of Fernan Lake
Village, 80 Idaho 412,331 P.2d 278 (1958), the city of Coeur d' Alene appealed a decision by the
Kootenai County Commission incorporating Fernan Lake Village. The appeal was taken
pursuant to I.C. § 31-1509 which at the time read in relevant part, as follows:
Any time within twenty days after the first publication or posting of the statement,
as required by section 31-819, an appeal may be taken from any act, order or
proceeding of the board, by any person aggrieved thereby, or by any taxpayer of
the county when any demand is allowed against the county or when he deems any
such act, order or proceeding illegal or prejudicial to the public interests[.]

Id. 80 Idaho at 414, 331 P .2d at 279. The city asserted that the proposed village abutted the
boundary of Coeur d'Alene, that the village was shaped in a bizarre and irregular manner, that its
shape was created for the sole purpose of meeting the resident requirements, that the creation of
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the village would hamper the natural growth of the city, and that, by creating a precedent, it
would strangle the natural growth of the city. Id. Despite the city's assertion that it would be
harmed by the incorporation of the proposed village, the Idaho Supreme Court determined that
the city was not a person aggrieved and not entitled to bring an appeal.
AURA's position in this matter is similar to the city in Fernan Lake. Like the city, it
alleges that another governmental entity has taken an action that will do it harm and seeks to
prevent the action. Also, like the city in Fernan Lake, it can point to no statute that authorizes its
participation in the matter and must rely on its assertion that it is a person aggrieved. In Fernan

Lake, the Supreme Court stated that "a party or person is aggrieved ... when, and only when, it
operates directly and injuriously upon his personal, pecuniary, or property rights[.]" In this case,
AURA cannot be aggrieved by the Board of Equalization's decisions regarding tax exemptions
or appraisals because, pursuant to the Idaho Code, urban renewal agencies have no right to
unlevied taxes.
An urban renewal agency's right to receive tax revenue is controlled by LC. § 502908(2). It makes clear that the urban renewal agencies do not have the right to a specific
amount of funds, but rather, receive whatever funds are available after taxes are levied and after
the taxing district, has received its allotment. Subsection (2) of I.C. § 50-2908 reads as follows:
(2) With respect to each such taxing district, the tax rate calculated under
subsection (1) of this section shall be applied to the current equalized assessed
valuation of all taxable property in the taxing district, including the taxable
property in the revenue allocation area. The tax revenues thereby produced shall
be allocated as follows:
(a) To the taxing district shall be allocated and shall be paid by the county
treasurer:
(i) All taxes levied by the taxing district or on its behalf on taxable
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property located within the taxing district but outside the revenue
allocation area;
(ii) A portion of the taxes levied by the taxing district or on its behalf on
the taxable property located within the revenue allocation area, which
portion is the amount produced by applying the taxing district's tax rate
determined under subsection (1) of this section to the equalized assessed
valuation, as shown on the base assessment roll, of the taxable property
located within the revenue allocation area; and
(iii) All taxes levied by the taxing district to satisfY obligations specified in
subsection (1 )( a) through (e) of this section.
(b) To the urban renewal agency shall be allocated the balance, if any, o/the
taxes levied on the taxable property located within the revenue allocation
area.
(Emphasis added). The statute makes clear urban renewal agencies are to receive only the
available balance after the taxing district has received its allocations. It also specifically
anticipates that there may be no available balance and urban renewal agencies may receive no
allocation. AURA cannot be aggrieved when it has no right to the property it was supposedly
deprived of.
The district court and AURA err in asserting that AURA has some interest in the
tax revenues generated from Ashton Memorial's property distinct from that of all other citizens
or governmental subdivisions whose budgets or allocations may be diminished due to the Board
of Equalization's grant of an exemption. AURA's interest in these funds is identical to that of all
other governmental entities that receive some portion of the tax money paid by Ashton
Memorial. If AURA is entitled to challenge a tax exemption or appraisal on the basis that it
deprives it of expected funds, the same can be said for a library district, cemetery district, school
district, or any other governmental entity to whom funds flow. The district court recognized this
would be the logical consequence of its decision, but determined that this concern was
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outweighed by the need to protect AURA given its "unique and vulnerable funding status" as an
urban renewal district.

CR. p.

110) However, if the legislature intended for all governmental

agencies to have the right to appeal tax decisions that affect them, it would have so stated. As
shown in the district court's discussion of decisions relating to Missouri and North Dakota
decisions, other states have done so.

CR. p.

107-108). In addition, the Idaho Legislature has done

so in other similar situations. For example, county assessors are expressly authorized to appeal
assessments by the state tax commission on operating property in the assessor's county. I.C. §
63-409. However, this court has determined that the assessor's right to appeal is limited to
assessments only and does not extend to the right to appeal a state tax commission decision
classifying property as operating or non-operating. Union Pacific Land Resources Corp. v.

Shoshone County Assessor, 140 Idaho 528, 96 P.3d 629 (2004). Idaho Code section 63-511
specifically authorizes appeals by a county assessor and the state tax commission. If the
legislature had intended other governmental entities to have the right to appeal exemption and
valuation decisions of county boards of equalization, it would have so stated.
B.

The district court erred in ruling that denying AURA the right to appeal the
Board of Equalization's decision would violate the principles of due process
and equal protection because AURA has no right to tax monies until such
time as the taxes are levied and allocated to other public entities and because
it is a subdivision of the state to whom these constitutional protections do not
apply.

The district court erred when it ruled that denying AURA standing would violate the
principles of due process and equal protections. R. p. 109-110. The first step in an analysis of
due process is to determine if the person has a threatened property or liberty interest. Smith v.

Meridian Joint School Dist. No.2, 128 Idaho 714, 722, 918 P.2d 583, 591 (1996). AURA cannot
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be entitled to due process regarding Ashton Memorial's tax exemption unless it has a property
interest in the nonlevied taxes. Idaho Code section 50-2908 makes clear that urban renewal
agencies are to receive funds from taxes actually levied and only after the taxing district has
received its allocation. The statute anticipates that the urban renewal agency may receive no
allocation whatsoever. Given I.C. § 50-2908, the district court erred in relying on the due
process and equal protection because AURA had no property or liberty interest in the taxes not
levied.
In addition, the district court erred in ruling that AURA is entitled to due process and
equal protection guarantees as against the state ofIdaho. AURA and all urban renewal agencies
are subdivisions of the state created to exercise powers held by the state and as such, state actions
in relation to urban renewal agencies are not restrained by due process or equal protections
concerns. I.C. § 50-2002; Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 785 So.2d 1, 12-13, (La .. 2001)
(citing Risty v. Chicago, R.I & P. Ry. Co., 270 U.S. 378, 390, 46 S.Ct. 236, 240 (1926) ("The

power of the state and its agencies over municipal corporations within its territory is not
restrained by the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment."»; Avon Lake City Sch. Dist. v.
Limbach, 35 Ohio St. 3d 118, 121, 518 N .E.2d 1190, 1192 (1988) (ci dng Hunter v. Pittsburgh,

207 U.S. 161,28 S.Ct. 40, 52 L.Ed. 151 (1907).
C.

The district court did not have jurisdiction to consider the appeal as AURA
failed to properly appeal by failing to provide notice of the appeal to
Fremont County.

The district court did not have jurisdiction to consider the appeal because AURA failed to
perfect its appeal as required by I.C. § 63-3812(a) and LR.C.P. 84. Compliance with the
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procedure for perfecting an appeal is a jurisdictional requirement. Briggs v. Golden Valley Land
& Cattle Co., 97 Idaho 427, 433,546 P.2d 382, 388 (1976) (citing Blinzler v. Andrews, 95 Idaho

769,519 P.2d 438 (1973)). This requirement is applicable in appeals to the district court as well
as in appeals to the Supreme Court. Id.
The process of appealing from the BTA to the district court is set out in I.C. § 63-3812(a)
of which reads as follows:
The appeal shall be taken and perfected in accordance with rule 84 of the Idaho
rules of civil procedure.
Rule 84 of the Idaho Rules of Ci viI Procedure is a lengthy rule that sets out procedures and
standards applicable to juridical review of state agency and local government actions. One of the
requirements in filing of an appeal is providing notice to other parties to the proceeding. Rule
84(b)(1) includes the following:
Judicial review is commenced by filing a petition for judicial review with the
district court, and the petitioner shall concurrently serve copies of the notice of
petition for judicial review upon the agency whose action will be reviewed and all
other parties to the proceeding before the agency (if there were parties to the
proceeding). Proof of service on the agency and all parties shall be filed with the
court in the form required by Rule 5(t).
(Emphasis added). In this case, AURA failed to serve copies of its notice of petition for judicial
review on Fremont County, who had been a party to the proceeding before the BTA. (R. p. 910.) AURA served the BTA and counsel for Ashton Memorial. Id. Neither Fremont County,
nor the Fremont County Board of Equalization was given notice or an opportunity to participate
in the proceedings before the district court. Fremont County was a party to the proceeding before
the BTA. It was listed on the proof of service on all documents filed by Ashton Memorial,
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AURA, and the BTA. (BTA R. 18,20,25,27,34,38,44,53,56.) AURA did not include the
Fremont County assessor, the Fremont County Board of Equalization, nor the Fremont County
prosecuting attorney, as parties to the appeal to the district court, nor provide them notice of the
appeal. (R. p. 9-10.) Because Fremont County failed to property perfect its appeal pursuant to
LR.C.P. 64(b)(1), the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

IV.

Conclusion
Because AURA is not a person aggrieved pursuant to I.C. § 63-511 and because AURA

did not properly perfect its appeal, the Court should reverse the district court's decision and
dismiss AURA's appeal.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of January, 2013.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL, HAND DELIVERY
OR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION
I hereby certify that a true a.'1d correct copy of the foregoing document was on this date
served upon the persons named below, at the addresses set out below their name, either by mailing, hand delivery or by telecopying to them a true and correct copy of said document in a
properly addressed envelope in the United States mail, postage prepaid; by hand delivery to
them; or by facsimile transmission.
DATED this 8th day of January, 2013.
RIGBY ANDRUS & RIGBY, Chartered
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Ryan P. Armbruster
Meghan S. Conrad
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